The Persian Empire revisited
Review of Persians: The Age of The Great Kings by Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones
The Achaemenids are remembered from Greek sources, in a kind of morality tale about overreach, oriental cruelty and sensual excess, and simple barbarism. The Greeks beat them, we are taught, because they were a better, braver people – the polar opposite of the decadent Persians. Going to original sources in thousands of imperial inscriptions and cuneiform tablets, this book purports to balance the picture in favor the phenomenal organization of the Persian Empire and the competence of its leaders, leaving an entirely different, and highly positive, impression.
The story begins with Cyrus the Great (r. 559-530 BCE), who was the nomad king of a relatively small Persian tribe on the Iranian plain. At the time of his ascension, there was many nomadic Persian tribes and they ranged over vast territories. Cyrus set out first to conquer the Medes, a tribe to the north. Once he beat them, Cyrus invented a novel policy that enabled him to build an Empire of unprecedented size and complexity.
Its elements included: 1) so long as they cooperated to their mutual benefit (i.e., provided dependable tributes), he left existing local notables in charge and with their traditional authority intact; 2) he allowed indigenous institutions and religions to function unimpaired, incorporating them to enhance his legitimacy; 3) while appointing one of his loyal followers to serve as his satrap, ideally his touch would remain light; 4) he did not impose the Persian language on them, but used Aramaic as the lingua franca of the Empire. In exchange for the tribute, subject peoples of the Empire enjoyed security and stability. This stood in stark contrast to previous empires in the vicinity, which subjugated local peoples and forced their assimilation, a virtual enslavement.
By the end of Cyrus’ reign, he presided over a vast Empire, the largest known in the world at that time. Still a nomad, he initiated a massive building program, in particular inaugurating work in 550 on the Achaemenid ceremonial capital, Persepolis. It was similar to Versailles, lending legitimacy to his rule in regular parades of fealty, though the Achaemenids appear never to have lived there. He also established a kind of written law, which was distributed throughout the Empire largely for propaganda purposes
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Cyrus was succeeded by Cambyses II, who got a bad rap in the Greek sources. Llewellyn-Jones argues that he was highly competent and should be remembered as the conqueror of Egypt, by far the wealthiest country of the time, particularly in its reliable grain harvest along the Nile. Unfortunately, because the Achaemenids never established an orderly means of succession, periodic civil war and elaborate conspiracies plagued the dynasty. Cambyses II, like up to ¾ of the imperial line, may have fallen victim to an assassination plot. After a brief period of chaos, a successor was chosen: Darius, who promptly married into Cyrus’ family as a way to claim he was part of the Achaemenids line. Darius enlarged and consolidated the Empire. He also completed most of the building in Persepolis.
If the Empire was run from the top like a dysfunctional family business, in the lower echelons its administration was run efficiently for the time, by a huge bureaucracy and communications system without precedent. Everywhere along the system of roads, there were imperial charter houses for functionaries going about the business of Empire. As Llewellyn-Jones meticulously demonstrates from cuneiform records, the organization was the most advanced of its time. Of course, the frequency of rebellions and brutal, even genocidal Persian reprisals indicates that the Empire did not always satisfy its subjects and was in constant danger of disintegration, which makes its longevity (550-330 BCE) all the more remarkable. I got the most out of this section.
The book provides a fascinating perspective on the Persians’ view of the Greeks: the latter were poor and uncivilized, by no means a major power; instead, they were disorganized into over 1,200 city states perpetually involved in petty wars. Most interestingly, the battle of Marathon (490 BCE) was viewed by Darius as a minor and quickly forgotten irritation, nothing anywhere near as decisive as Herodotus’ portrayal. The second Persian invasion (482-479 BCE), led by Xerxes (the son and heir of Darius, r. 486-465 BCE), was a normal attempt to aggrandize the size of the Empire, not the attempt at blood retribution that Herodotus claimed. Llewellyn-Jones further argues that Xerxes was clearly on the path to victory, that the battle of Thermopylae (think “The 300”) was a Persian triumph, and that the strategic turning point – the naval battle of Salamis in 480 – was a lucky and last-chance win for the Athenians. Finally, refuting the conventional wisdom that Salamis “saved western culture,” Llewellyn-Jones asserts that, in the event of victory, the Persians would have allowed Greek culture to survive intact and in security. (I happen to think that he exaggerates these points, if only because his academic specialty is Persia. However well he marshalled disparate evidence, it is revisionism.)
This offers valuable perspective. However, poking holes in the Greeks’ grand narrative reveals the limitations of Llewellyn-Jones’ approach: Herodotus and others told a coherent story that, in my view, overwhelms the bits and pieces available for reinterpretation. For example, in the retelling of the lethal high jinks of Xerxes’ court – how a gift robe woven by the alpha queen signaled the danger of civil war – Llewellyn-Jones can only find vaguely supporting evidence, but includes the tale anyway. I enjoyed reading it, but there wasn’t as much new to it as I expected. Moreover, the sudden, catastrophic fall of the Achaemenids to Alexander the Great also fits the Greek narrative: perhaps the Persian Empire had grown decadent. Instead of accepting Herodotus’ tale of morality, Llewellyn-Jones bends over backward to portray Darius III as a competent leader in spite of his total failure to preserve the dynasty. I wasn’t convinced; Herodotus may have spun an inaccurate narrative, but it’s still the best one we’ve got.
In spite of these criticisms, Llewellyn-Jones offers a vital portrait of the first great Empire. It is beautifully written and full of wonderful detail, particularly about the mechanics of governance and the socio-economic tidbits that can be pieced together from scattered cuneiform texts and the occasional imperial inscription. He also goes into how the Achaemenids came to be viewed by later Empire, from the Parthians to the Shah of Iran in 1971, whose celebration of that Empire allegedly cost $600 million and contributed to his downfall. A fun read.