Standard diplomatic history with little analysis and even less on culture

Review of Ottoman Centuries by Lord Kinross

The Ottoman story is remarkable: founded in the 13^th century, a small tribe began to build an empire in Central Asia and expanded into Byzantine territory, stopping at the gates of Vienna in 1529. Conquering large swaths of territory in North Africa and the Arabian peninsula, it had expanded unchecked for 200 years, became a sea power, controlling most of the Mediterranean Sea. Though Western Europe was recovering from its medieval nadir, it remained under mortal threat. Then began a long period of decline as the Ottoman Empire became "the sick man of Europe". After the 1^st World War, most of its empire was divided up by the European powers, creating many of the disputes in the middle east that last to the present.

In the beginning, the political organization of the Empire was innovative: with a sultan at its head as an enlightened dictator, it functioned largely as a military meritocracy, where capable leaders were given huge new areas to govern (and exploit) for a designated period of time; notably, it did not evolve into a hereditary aristocracy entrenched in geographic territory. In this way, the Ottomans largely avoided the creation of the localized, independent powers that feudal kings had to manage; chivalric privilege also did not block talent from rising, as it did in Europe.

In addition, a superlative marshal elite was established in the Janissaries, who were Christian children levied into slavery from southeastern Europe and converted to Islam, less as religious fanatics than as a professional corps with a coherent world view. This fighting force, which preceded European nationalist armies, was superior to the mercenary forces then employed by the Holy Roman Empire. The basic military technique of the great sultans was to launch an expendable group of amateur soldiers to exhaust their opponents, preparing the ground for elite troops and cavalry to swoop in at the right moment. This made the Ottomans appear to be an unstoppable force that struck fear into adversaries for hundreds of years.

Finally, the Turks were relatively tolerant of the people within the empire: for a tax, subjects could pursue their livelihoods in security, if within rather strict caste-like bounds. Or, they could enter service to the state, with better career paths if they converted to Islam. Not surprisingly, many preferred this situation to the heavy hand of the Latin and Orthodox churches of Christendom, which demanded conversion in most cases. Astonishingly, this cultural harmony stood until the rise of nationalism in the 19^th century. I was very disappointed that the cultural achievements of this society received absolute minimal treatment in this book.

Then once the Empire, under Suleiman the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566), reached the apogee of its territorial acquisitions, problems came to the fore. The necessity became to manage and defend vast territories, which was a far more complex task than to enlarge an empire whose only real administration consisted of dividing the spoils among potentates and casual warriors. Unfortunately, Suleiman's heirs did not understand for too long that a fundamental change was underway and made no moves to reform what was essentially a medieval empire that was extremely cruel by today's standards (it was accepted routine that, to avoid civil war, the chosen Sultan murdered all of his brothers).

As Europe entered the modern age, the time for a traditional empire was passing. Rather than allow soldiers to sack conquered areas in place of pay and divide new territories between trusted pashas to manage, they needed to develop a more modern state. This sapped the Empire's dynamism and led to their first major defeats. Soon, the empire became more of a diplomatic power than a military one, a factor (however major) in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe over the next 400 years. Even worse, the Sultan's children no longer were given territories to administer while young, which acquainted them with both the issues of governance and the concerns of commoners, but literally remained hostages within the palace; the harem shaped their life view. Courtiers ran the Court, along with mistresses, Vizier ministers, and the top Janissaries by force of arms. It became a simple despotism from this point.

Of course, Europe did not stand still, as a revolution in thinking and technology was underway with the Renaissance and then the Enlightenment. At this point, the Ottoman Empire began to gradually shrink, which this book describes in excessive detail, i.e. over hundreds of pages. The task of understanding this is made harder by the poor maps in the book, which are of marginal aid in following developments in the Balkans that are complexity itself.

While there were a few reformist Sultans from the late 18^th century, the weight of history that they had to overcome was too great. What were innovative institutions had become implacable obstacles to reform. For example, the Janissaries periodically revolted with extreme violence and often imposed themselves as kingmakers via coups d'etat. Moreover, there was also the beginning of hereditary privilege and truly legendary corruption. Even the massacre of the entire Janissary force was not enough to lead to the creation of a constitutional monarchy, though several Sultans tried to do so, only to be ousted. Eventually, nationalism led to the persecution of minorities in the Empire, including the first genocide of the 20^th century, the Armenians. The earlier cultural tolerance was dead, alienating all non-Turkic peoples under their administration and ending the eclectic society that had been so fruitful.

The book concludes with a long description of the last Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, a capricious despot who hated people and yet completed the creation of an education system, providing a humanist infrastructure for the era of Atatürk. The story stops here, leaving the transition of the Empire into Turkey, with the development of a modern state based on laws and alternance of power. Throughout, the author makes the case, which I found convincing, that the Turks achieved a relative success in the creation of a stable  and enlightened regime, when compared to their counterparts elsewhere in the Near East. It makes for an admirably balanced view and useful historical perspective.

This book offers a grand survey at the undergraduate level. You get a chronological treatment of the empire's expansion and then its stagnation and decline. Unfortunately, it often gets lost in the details of territorial conquests, that is, which odd little principalities are in play at what moment, how the fight went, and what the ramifications were for the Ottoman empire's territorial integrity. While it is essential to understand this for the history of Europe and Asia minor from 1200 to the present day, as a reading experience, this makes for a pretty thick slog at times. Unfortunately, there are far too few ideas as to what were the causes behind the Empire’s evolution or what it accomplished in the cultural realm. That means there is little depth or flavor and predominantly facts and more facts.

To be sure, I learned a great deal from this book, but it was neither original nor a compelling narrative. Indeed, the bibliography is barely one page, and only a few primary sources appear in it. Contrast that to Tuchman's masterful Distant Mirror, which is written for popular audience but also a marvel of solid original research, and the pedestrian nature of this book is evident. I am glad I read it, but would not want to read it a second time.

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