Fascinating and fundamental interpretation of Augustus' regime

Review of The Roman Revolution by Ronald Symes

This massive work of scholarship covers the period roughly from Marius to Tiberius, which saw the fall of the traditional oligarchic republic and its replacement by the despotic monarchy as designed by Augustus. While it has a great deal about the politics, it also addresses issues related to the administration of the Empire.

The empowerment of the Tribunes of the People under the Gracchi brothers (r. 133 and 122-121 BCE) enabled popular assemblies to make and veto law, originally the exclusive prerogative of the Roman Senate. While this enabled the Plebians to participate in power with the Patricians as near-equals, it also multiplied the opportunities for obstruction and delay. With the multiple new avenues to power, including mob-inciting demagogues who ruled the streets, a cacophony of laws were promulgated, though more often legislation was blocked by Tribunes. This created a dangerous political stalemate at a moment of fundamental change: the expansion of the empire beyond Italy. The army gained political power as enforcer and monopoly holder of organized violence, but the subject peoples became interested in accessing and influencing the old-style oligarchy.

Together, these developments pushed the Roman Republic into a period of unprecedented crisis. The result was over a century of recurring civil war, which almost invariably erupted during transfers of power at the change of the yearly consulship. It was only Augustus (r. 27 BCE to 14 CE) who solved the conundrum of who should wield power with the creation of a kind of monarchy, in this view.

Prior to this crisis, Rome was governed much as a Greek City State, with a narrow local elite taking advantage of its subject peoples in support of their power games via the extraction of their wealth; responsibilities were thrust onto governors (for periods too short to learn much about their provinces) who had little knowledge of administration and usually cared nothing for the welfare of local subjects. The Roman Oligarchy had ruled for hundreds of years in this way, transferring power on a yearly basis to consuls as voted by the Senate, which prevented the development of autocratic power. It was essentially an aristocracy of Patricians (descendants of those who overthrew the monarchs in 509 BCE) and rich Plebians who had achieved military glory in times of crisis (e.g. the Scipios, who defeated Hannibal in 202 BCE).

Senators had to maintain their prestige through lavish displays of wealth in public events but also to help their client base, all to serve the glory of their families. Rather than parties or ideology, their power was based on family alliances as extended by a loyal "clientele" sworn to mutual assistance. Underneath them were the equestrians, who were businessmen and local aristocrats in the provinces; they concentrated on making money more often than sought glory. Finally, there was the proletariat. Only rarely did "new men", such as the military genius Caius Marius, arise to hold power in times of external threat.

Politically, this system worked reasonably well until Rome became a Mediterranean superpower. First, the source of soldiers – gentleman farmers – proved inadequate to the requirement of years of foreign military service: they were too few and, in any event, they had to work the fields regularly or face ruin. This opened the way to the establishment of a professional army by Marius in 107 BCE, in which the proletariat and anyone else could serve for wages and make a career.

Second, the subject peoples of Rome wanted the same rights as the citizens; they rebelled violently and had to be suppressed with increasing frequency. With the opportunities that the Tribunate offered to go over the heads of the Senatorial oligarchy, Marius created a new structure of power, which included both his loyal soldiers and the proletariat as well as the provincials - the loyalty of the new army began to go to the generals under whom they served rather than the quasi-religious fealty that the Republic and its Senate had enjoyed with the gentleman farmers.

Sulla, Marius' protégé and then rival for power, attempted to reinstall the old oligarchy in a bloody civil war (83-81 BCE) that wiped out a vast array of political talent from the ranks of the oligarchy and equestrians. It was here that the powerful generals – Pompey (allied with provincials) and soon Julius Caesar (a Patrician favoring the "common man") – emerged to battle the old oligarchy in a conflict that eventually destroyed the Republic in 27 BCE.

While still a teenager, Octavian (mysteriously adopted by Caesar just prior to his assassination and later known as Octavius and then Augustus) then stepped into the breach and after much struggle completely reshaped the power structure. The true genius of Augustus (r. 27 BCE – 14CE), according to Syme, is that he was able to use the power of the armies – he gained command of the most important nearby legions in case of need – while channeling the ambitions of citizens into service to Rome (and to himself, of course). He did this by creating legitimate outlets for the energies of ambitious men of talent (as military officials but also as professional administrators), who served the state and empire as bureaucrats rather than constantly maneuvering for executive power within the traditional oligarchy.

Essentially, in addition to opening administration to talent from the provinces, Augustus made a major step in the establishment of the apparatus for a more modern state, replacing the amateurish behavior of non-professionals that was the hallmark of Greek City States.

This is a wonderful interpretation that makes many aspects of Roman history comprehensible beyond naked grabs for personal power and glory. In Syme's view, the huge Roman Empire had become ungovernable by the fractious oligarchy, denuded as it was of talent over the previous 100 years of civil war; Augustus buried the old oligarchy while maintaining the appearance of the republic's institutions, bringing order at the price of liberty, which an exhausted citizenry apparently welcomed. It was truly the passing of a torch from a moribund, then decimated oligarchy to a new generation more open to talent. There were plenty of aristocrats and wealthy notables who remained power players, but their influence was no longer guaranteed. There is no doubt that much of this is accurate, in my opinion.

That being said, Syme makes many judgments that I found questionable, though they are of nuance rather than the core ideas regarding political power that I find very sound. He portrays Augustus as a proto-totalitarian, while I think he was a simple despot. He likes both Marc Antony and Tiberius, while I think they were mediocre libertines. These are things we can never know for certain, of course, so my interpretation is personal.

Regarding Syme's method, I want to add a note of caution for the reader. He assumes a certain level of knowledge; if the reader lacks it, the book will be very rough going and dry. You need to know not only who Sulla and Cato were, but also Livius Drusus, Crassus, the Metelli, and many, many others. Syme did not intend to retell any of the stories attached to them. You also need to know the history and chronology of Rome from about 150 BCE to 30 CE. If you have this grounding, the book is truly a joy of subtle interpretation and analysis accomplished by a master scholar, who knows every obscure scrap of written sources that supports his case. The book also has a quirky, though elegant writing style.

This is one of the best books on Roman history that I have ever read, but it is not for casual readers. You need to be something of a Roman history enthusiast before you read this, either at the undergraduate level or having read the wonderful historical novels of McCullough.