Ex-German and Ottoman territories under “internationalist” mandate

Review of The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire by Susan Pedersen

Rather than a general diplomatic history of the League of Nations, this book is about a very specific mission: the first attempt to “internationalize” the administration of former colonies and conquered territories taken from the losing alliance of World War I. They were not awarded as war booty or compensation, but as places to develop, where the native inhabitants had rights and perhaps even an autonomous or democratic future. At least, those were the Wilsonianisms included in the allied agreements. To do so, the mandatory powers had to set in place international institutions, agree on rules of conduct, and even create a bureaucracy to oversee actions and results. It was not supposed to be political or exploitive. While this effort is viewed as a complete failure, Pederson argues that it set an important precedent and even met with limited political success. Unfortunately, the book is a dry, academic read in spite of the very interesting issues and occasionally rich narratives.

Pederson sees 3 periods of the mandate. First (1919 to 1926), once the USA withdrew from the League, the mandatory powers included Britain, France, Japan, Portugal, and a few others. Germany was excluded, the USSR was absent, involved in its civil war. Taking the center stage, Britain and France essentially used the League of Nations as a) a place to negotiate compromises of their interests as the big colonial powers and b) an instrument of legitimation for their positions and actions. While there was some oversight, the lack of enforcement powers and conflicts of interest – the mandatory powers were supposed to administer as well as adjudicate disputes – made a joke of their legalistic approach to the territories. Official reports tended to deliberately mislead, independent verification was minimal and often privately funded, and, given that the territories were adjacent to their respective colonies, the latter tended to invest in infrastructure in ways that would enhance the wellbeing and stability of their colonies.

Indeed, it appears, the Wilsonianisms did little more than provide cover for the aims of the colonial powers. Mandated to improve the lot of the native populations, administrators in the field often interpreted this to mean they could force them to labor virtually as slaves, uncompensated and without legal rights. It was better, in this (racist) reasoning, for them to work than stand idle as they were presumed to do. Even worse, the mandatory powers could resort to military force at their discretion, as the French did in the ruinous bombing of Damascus. While the British were attempting to balance forces in Palestine between Arabs and Jews (emigrating in ever greater numbers), they imposed a harsh regime of repression that met resistance from both groups. There are many interesting stories of mismanagement and the pursuit of naked gain. In particular, the destruction of the unique Samoan culture – administered with a light hand by the Germans prior to World War I – serves as a reminder to the brutality and ignorance of the colonial powers.

Second (to 1933), representatives from the Weimar Republic entered the League of Nations and tried to advance the good faith application of Wilsonian principles, which they often could pursue with some knowledge of their former colonies. In Pederson’s view, this period was the most functional of all. Excesses were challenged, forcing offending mandatory powers to justify their positions, while a nascent international bureaucracy was forming, composed of more idealistic policy entrepreneurs beyond the national interests of their respective countries. She makes a good case.

Third (until World War II), Pederson covers the disintegration of the system as the mandatory powers openly fought for political, economic, and military advantages in preparation for the coming war. However pioneering their application was, Wilsonian principles became shambolic, with mandatory powers explicitly repudiating them in word and action. Once again, Palestine serves as an example: British attempts to please both sides were a disastrous failure, setting the stage for the implacable conflict that ensued. On the one hand, the British recognized the need for Arab resources and manpower. In this way, Iraq became the first “independent” state of its own, with nominal Arab leaders in what was effectively a client state of the Empire that offered exclusive access to oil, the right of military passage, and soldiers. On the other hand, they wanted to keep the Jews as allies, both in Eastern Europe and as a moral example, thus allowing an enormous influx of refugees that profoundly alienated the Arab population. In other words, Britain monopolized the advantages.

The book can be read as a revisionist history of the League of Nations, or at least, the mission of administering the territories formerly under the jurisdiction of Germans and Turks – the losers of the war. In my interpretation, Pederson argues that it is the first modern instance where: a) the conduct of the mandatory powers could be monitored through an international organization rather than a national government or colonial power; b) the goals were development in preparation for some form of autonomy, with a view to preserve local cultures; and c) the consideration of these issues took place as a kind of interrelated whole, what today we might call transnational; the actions were supposed to be debated and agreed upon by mandatory powers. This is indeed interesting, setting examples from which to learn in the service of subsequent international organization building as well as introducing concepts that were later taken up by academics and journalists, a new vocabulary if you will - "internationalism". Following the logic of this argument, the impact of the League of Nations Mandates was profound, if inchoate and scorned as an abject failure at the time. There is much to this view, though I fear it is too idealistic.

This book is a specialized academic treatment. I did not get a clear view of the institutional mechanics of the League of Nations or even the mandate regime. It also neglected the wider context in my view, particularly given that the League of Nations operated in many other capacities that go unmentioned. Finally, about half the content is about the negotiations that went on behind the scenes – what was proposed, how the actors maneuvered to advance them, where they eventually led. This is important for academics and perhaps even as diplomatic paths that might be taken in the future, but it makes for very boring reading. Fortunately, many of the detailed case studies offer fascinating details and occasionally interesting characters.

I would recommend this book for academic purposes. It is essential diplomatic history. Unfortunately, it is not geared for the lay reader.

Below is a related review of a book that offer a more general overview: